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Abstract
We outline a framework for analyzing episodes from the history of science in
which the application of mathematics plays a constitutive role in the concep-
tual development of empirical sciences. Our starting point is the inferential
conception of the application of mathematics, recently advanced by Bueno
and Colyvan (2011). We identify and discuss some systematic problems of
this approach. We propose refinements of the inferential conception based
on theoretical considerations and on the basis of a historical case study. We
demonstrate the usefulness of the refined, dynamical inferential conception
using the well-researched example of the genesis of general relativity. Specif-
ically, we look at the collaboration of the physicist Einstein and the math-
ematician Grossmann in the years 1912–1913, which resulted in the jointly
published “Outline of a Generalized Theory of Relativity and a Theory of
Gravitation,” a precursor theory of the final theory of general relativity. In
this episode, independently developed mathematical theories, the theory of
differential invariants and the absolute differential calculus, were applied in
the process of finding a relativistic theory of gravitation. The dynamical
inferential conception not only provides a natural framework to describe and
analyze this episode, but it also generates new questions and insights. We
comment on the mathematical tradition on which Grossmann drew, and on
his own contributions to mathematical theorizing. The dynamical inferential
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conception allows us to identify both the role of heuristics and of mathemat-
ical resources as well as the systematic role of problems and mistakes in the
reconstruction of episodes of conceptual innovation and theory change.
Keywords: Applicability of Mathematics, Genesis of general relativity,
Absolute differential calculus, Inferential conception, Einstein, Grossmann
Highlights
• Extends and refines the inferential conception of the application of
mathematics.
• Examines the interaction of mathematics and physics in the genesis of
general relativity.
• Focuses on the first application of the absolute differential calculus
(tensor calculus) to general relativity.
• Emphasizes the internal dynamics of mathematical theories.
1. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to gain a better understanding of the interac-
tion of mathematics and physics in the genesis of empirical theories, and
to contribute to the philosophical debate of the application of mathematics
in empirical science. We intend to develop further a framework for think-
ing systematically about the application of mathematics. We will apply this
framework to an important historical case, the use of the “absolute differen-
tial calculus”, what is now called tensor calculus, in the genesis of general
relativity.1
The problem of understanding how mathematics is applied in the em-
pirical sciences has been discussed in philosophy of mathematics, but until
recently, the debate has only been marginal in comparison to the more dom-
inant discussion of problems associated with pure mathematics.2 One of the
starting points of the debate, some 50 years ago, is a famous paper by Eugene
1The present paper draws on Ra¨z (2013, Part II).
2For recent survey articles of the issue of applicability, see Colyvan (2009) and Steiner
(2005).
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Wigner (1960) on the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the nat-
ural sciences.” Wigner formulated his astonishment in general terms, and his
examples were taken from a variety of different instances of applications from
different epochs. But, historically, we believe the background for Wigner’s
paper, and its impact, was the effectiveness that mathematics had borne out
in the first half of the twentieth century with the emergence of both the
general theory of relativity and the development of quantum theory.
Although Wigner recognized the generality of the problem, in earlier times
the problem of applicability did not arise as from a moment of surprise.
Euclidean geometry deals with the geometry of straight lines and circles, and
solves construction tasks only with the help of ruler and compass. To be sure,
it gives an axiomatic treatment of the geometry of three-dimensional ruler-
compass space and it proves its assertions using language and symbolism.
But the origin of its theorems in practical geometric experience, and the
naturalness of its axioms for our physical world were all too obvious. When
Hilbert stripped the geometric axioms of their direct meaning, he still insisted
that historically, geometry was a natural science. It had only evolved to a
state where its concepts and results had become so firm that no one doubted
their validity any more, and they could be entirely transformed into a field
of mathematics.
The origins and applicability of differential calculus may be a similar case.
Conceived by its creators as a general tool to describe physical motion—see
Newton’s term of “fluxion” for the (time-)derivative—it was meant to be a
way of putting physical phenomena into a more rigid, practical, and effective
mathematical representation. As argued by Ivor Grattan-Guinness (2008),
a historical perspective helps to alleviate much of the “unreasonableness” of
Wigner’s “unreasonable effectiveness.”
Euclidean geometry, in all its subtlety, was for a long time never applied
to anything else than physical geometry. This changed with Hilbert’s under-
standing of axiomatics, and Hilbert himself used both the electrochemical
series and the laws of heredity of drosophila as models for the Euclidean
axioms of linear congruence; see Sauer and Majer (2009, pp. 420–423) and
Hilbert (1930). More obvious was the versatility and generality of differen-
tial calculus, which proved not only applicable, but indispensable for almost
any field of the natural sciences throughout the nineteenth century. But the
Go¨ttingen praise of the “preestablished harmony” between mathematics and
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physics was most pointedly illustrated by the example of general relativity.3
Mark Steiner (1998) takes the issue of applicability a step further. He
argues that there is not one problem of applicability, but many problems
that have to be kept separate. Steiner maintains, contra Wigner, that the
use of individual mathematical concepts in empirical science may not be the
main puzzle. He emphasizes the philosophical problem that mathematics
as a whole turns out to be so enormously successful, despite the fact that
mathematics obeys anthropocentric criteria such as beauty and convenience.4
Recent discussions of applicability have shifted their focus from the dis-
cussion of problems of applicability, such as the unreasonable effectiveness,
to providing a positive account of the various roles that mathematics plays
in application. In the present paper, we intend to take up one of these
accounts, the so-called “inferential conception” of the application of math-
ematics proposed by Bueno and Colyvan (2011). We find the basic outline
of the inferential conception to be promising for our goal of a philosophical
understanding of the application of mathematics. However, a confrontation
with historical case studies forces us to extend this account. We will out-
line the inferential conception and its extension to a “dynamical inferential
conception” in section 2.
We will then explore the approach with an important case of the appli-
cation of mathematics, an episode from the genesis of general relativity, in
section 3. This case not only has the advantage that we can draw on detailed
3In a talk held in Copenhagen in March 1921, Hilbert said: “The mathematician, who
has noticed with surprise so often already the preestablished harmony between his own
thinking and the world, is almost forced to the conception as if nature had purposely been
created in such a way that in order to grasp her the deepest mathematical speculations are
needed.” (“Der Mathematiker aber, der schon so oft die praestabilirte Harmonie zwischen
seinem Denken und der Wirklichkeit mit Staunen bemerkt, wird fast zu der Vorstellung
gezwungen, als sei die Natur eigens so eingerichtet, dass es zu ihrer Erfassung der tiefsten
mathematischen Spekulationen bedarf.”) (Sauer and Majer, 2009, p. 387) In his lectures
on the development of mathematics in the nineteenth century, Felix Klein wrote: “But the
wonderful harmony, which we find between the developments of the pure mathematicians
and the intellectual constructions of the theoretical physicists, is confirmed once again in an
extended realm.” (“Die wunderbare Harmonie aber, welche zwischen den Entwicklungen
der reinen Mathematiker und den Gedankenkonstruktionen der neueren Physiker besteht,
bewa¨hrt sich aufs neue auf einem erweitertem Gebiete.” (Klein, 1927, p. 79)), see also his
comments on Riemannian geometry and general relativity in (Klein, 1921, pp. 557–558).
4Steiner discusses the discovery of the field equations of GR, one of our case studies,
on pp. 94. We will turn to his argument below in section 3.3.2.
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historical analyses for our study,5 it is also an example from the history of
science where mathematics has played a prominent role in concept forma-
tion. More specific reasons for choosing this particular episode will be given
in section 3.3
We do not claim that this case is particularly typical, or that it warrants
general lessons about how mathematics is applied. It merely serves as a
first case that exhibits some important characteristics of application. It will
be necessary to extend the examination of the use of mathematics to other
episodes in the genesis of general relativity, and to other cases, such as the
discovery of Maxwell’s equations or the history of quantum mechanics, and
finally to other fields of empirical science, in order to gain general and stable
insight into this issue. In short, the philosophical account will serve as a
conceptual framework, which will help us to understand the case better; this
enhanced understanding, in turn, will lead to a refinement of the account.
A historical approach to the issue of application and applicability has
itself a historical tradition, and there are systematic reasons why the ex-
amination of historical cases is particularly fruitful. A historical approach
has been part of the discussion at least since Steiner (1998) formulated one
problem of applicability as a puzzle about the surprising role of mathematics
in discovery. The inferential conception, as proposed by Bueno and Colyvan
(2011), has been designed to capture the historical process of application.
Systematically, we are not only interested in the finished product of the pro-
cess of applying mathematics, we are also interested in the process itself. We
are convinced that in order to fully appreciate a mathematically formulated
empirical theory, it is indispensable to understand the historical process that
led to this theory. The process of applying mathematics to empirical prob-
lems plays an important role in the formation of scientific concepts, and,
more generally, in theory dynamics.
2. The Dynamical Inferential Conception
In this section, we introduce a philosophical framework for the process
of the application of mathematics. We begin by sketching two existing ac-
counts of application, the so-called “mapping account” by Christopher Pin-
5The literature on the genesis and history of general relativity is quite extensive. A
good starting point are the four volumes on the genesis of general relativity edited by
Ju¨rgen Renn (2007). More specific items will be cited where pertinent.
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cock (2004) and the “inferential conception” proposed by Otavio Bueno and
Mark Colyvan (2011), a more flexible version of the mapping account. We
then discuss certain problems of the inferential conception. This motivates
an extension of the approach to what we call the “dynamical inferential con-
ception.”
2.1. The Mapping Account and the Inferential Conception
Bueno and Colyvan (2011) use a familiar picture of applying mathematics
as a foil for their own account. On this picture, mathematics helps us in ap-
plication, by representing empirical structures in mathematical form; we can
then learn about the world, by examining this mathematical representation.
The application relation is established via a structure-preserving mapping,
which connects the mathematical structure with relevant parts of the world.6
The mapping account is illustrated in Fig. 1.
A city street map is a useful illustration of the mapping account. A city
street map represents parts of the structure of a city by mirroring the street
system and buildings of the city in some detail. A map will usually leave out
some information, such as vertical slope, and sometimes it will not even faith-
fully mirror distances. However, there should be some correspondence, i.e. a
mapping, between elements of the street map and elements of the city—most
importantly, it should represent how various parts of the city are connected,
and allow inferences about actual pathways in the city. Information about
the city can be inferred from information given by the map, and therein lies
its usefulness.
Bueno and Colyvan (2011) identify several problems with the mapping
account and argue that it cannot be a complete story of why mathematics
is useful in application. The motivation behind the inferential conception is
to solve these problems, or at least indicate how they might be solved, and
thus present a more complete picture of the application of mathematics.
The inferential conception breaks down the process of applying mathe-
matics into three steps (see also Fig. 2):
1. In the immersion step, we specify a mapping from the relevant aspects
of the empirical domain to a mathematical structure.
6The mapping account has been spelled out in detail in Pincock (2004). Mapping
accounts have a long tradition, e.g. in the debate on scientific representation and modeling.
We will return to this point in the discussion of the inferential conception below.
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World Mathematics
Figure 1: The mapping account: a structure-preserving mapping connects mathematical
structure with relevant parts of the world.
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2. In the derivation step, also called deduction step, we realize math-
ematical inferences, licensed by the mathematical theory, about the
immersed structure. This step takes place entirely within the mathe-
matical domain.
3. In the interpretation step, the consequences found in the derivation
step are mapped back to the empirical domain, that is, we interpret
the results of our mathematical investigation. The mapping we use in
the interpretation step is not necessarily the inverse of the immersion
mapping.
The inferential conception has several advantages over the mapping ac-
count.
First, since it distinguishes the immersion from the interpretation step,
different mappings may be used for the initial immersion step and the subse-
quent interpretation of a possibly different piece of the mathematical struc-
ture. Second, the distinction between the immersion and interpretation steps
allows us to interpret the inferential conception in a dynamical way— by go-
ing back and forth between mathematics and the world, one can gradually
refine the mathematical description, discover new empirical phenomena, or
revise one’s assumed preconceptions about the world. A third important
feature is the emphasis on the derivation step. Bueno and Colyvan (2011)
describe the usefulness of mathematics in application emphasized by the in-
ferential conception as follows: “[B]y embedding certain features of the em-
pirical world into a mathematical structure, it is possible to obtain inferences
that would otherwise be extraordinarily hard (if not impossible) to obtain.”
(p. 352).
These properties set the inferential conception apart from the mapping
account: the distinction between immersion and interpretation, and the in-
termediate deduction step, which are both absent from the mapping account,
make it possible to give a dynamical account of application, i.e., describe ap-
plication as a process of gradual refinement. This is not possible if there
exists only one structural correspondence, which can only be replaced as a
whole.
Bueno and Colyvan (2011) rely on the so-called “partial structures” frame-
work in order to solve one particular problem of the mapping account, ideal-
izations. We will not rely on partial structures in the following. This should
be harmless, as the framework of the inferential conception, on which we
build, is independent of the partial structures framework. See, e.g., Pincock
8
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Figure 2: The inferential conception: the mapping between the empirical and mathemat-
ical domains is differentiated into an immersion step and an interpretation step, and the
deduction step allows inferences licensed by the mathematical theory.
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(2005) and Sua´rez and Cartwright (2008) for systematic criticism of partial
structures. We will discuss particular idealizations on a case-by-case basis.
Bueno and Colyvan (2011) are not the first to emphasize the importance
of the deduction step for scientific representation and modeling. The impor-
tance of inferences for representation and modeling was first pointed out by
Mauricio Sua´rez (2004), who defends an inferential conception of scientific
representation in general. R.I.G. Hughes (1997) has proposed the “DDI”
(Denotation, Demonstration, Interpretation) account of scientific modeling,
which also emphasizes the inferential step on top of the world-model and the
model-world correspondences. Nancy Nersessian’s (2008) and Susan Carey’s
(2009) accounts of conceptual change as a process of (Quinian) “bootstrap-
ping” consists of a trias of positing placeholder structures, modeling construc-
tion procedures such as analogy construction, limiting case analysis, thought
experiments, and inductive inference, and, lastly, real world interpretation.
Morphism-based accounts of scientific representation have been criticized;
e.g. Sua´rez (2003) advances arguments against morphism-based accounts of
modeling and representation. We will comment on what we perceive to be
the most serious problems of the inferential conception in the next section.
We would like to emphasize that our goal is to understand the role of math-
ematical means of reasoning in application; in this respect, our account is
more modest. Also, as of now, we do not claim that our account is generally
valid; we merely hope that it will illuminate the present case, and suspend
judgement as to its range of applicability until further cases are examined.
2.2. Problems of the Inferential Conception
In this section, we identify, and discuss, several problems of the inferential
conception.
2.2.1. The Assumed Structure Problem
Both mapping account and the inferential conception are based on the
idea that a correspondence between mathematics and the world is established
via structure-preserving mappings. To give an example, if we are interested in
the existence of connections between parts of a city, we need a city street map
that has the topological structure of the city, i.e., we require the existence of
a homeomorphism between the map and the city. This creates the following
problem: If we want to account for the applicability of mathematics based on
mappings, we have to assume that some sort of structure is in the world that
can be preserved by the mapping. However, there is simply no guarantee
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that the world is conveniently structured in this way. We have to take it
for granted that there is some meaningful way of discerning and using the
structure of the world. This is the “assumed structure problem.”
Bueno and Colyvan present a solution to this problem. If we adopt the
inferential conception, we can start from a tentative assumed structure in
the world, and gradually revise that structure, after our inferential investiga-
tions, by choosing a new interpretation mapping. Bueno and Colyvan (2011)
write that there is no need to “formally revise” the initial assumed structure,
as the interpretation mapping need not be the the inverse of the immersion
mapping. Once more, the back-and-forth between empirical and mathemat-
ical domains and the emphasis on inferences are key. The assumed structure
is “something like a pre-theoretic structure of the world (or at least a pre-
modeling structure of the world)” (p. 347). As the name “assumed structure”
suggests, this is not structure that we should take metaphysically seriously.
Rather, it is “tentative” structure that can be revised once we have brought
mathematics into play: “the assumed structure is the structure the modeling
exercise assumes to be present in the [...] empirical setup [...] the inter-
pretation step of the process will deliver the final structure of the empirical
setup [...]” (p. 357). Thus, even if we carve the world up in a certain way
prior to the immersion step, we are not committed to this being the real
structure of the world; the discovery of that structure is the result of going
back-and-forth. The inferential conception mirrors this historical process of
mathematization.
Several objections can be raised against this response of the inferential
conception to the assumed structure problem. We will discuss two objections
in the next paragraphs.
The circularity objection. A first objection7 against the inferential conception
is that the assumed structure problem creates the following difficulty for all
accounts that rely on mappings. We have to conceive of the immersion and
interpretation mappings as mathematical objects. Therefore, both domain
and codomain have to be mathematical as well. But then, a mapping cannot
account for the application of mathematics to the world. All we have is a
mapping from an assumed mathematical structure, which is not really in the
world, to mathematics. Mappings cannot possibly explain how mathematics
7We thank members of the audience at the Workshop “Metaphysics of science: objects,
relations and structures” of October 2012 in Lausanne for this objection.
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can be applied to the world; they can only explain how mathematics can be
applied to some other mathematical domain. The inferential conception is
therefore circular.
This problem can be dissolved. We agree that, in some cases, including
the case study we are about to consider, the assumed structure is given in
mathematical form. However, this does not mean that the structure under
consideration is mathematical. Rather, the mathematics represents a certain
empirical structure. The immersion mapping establishes a correspondence
between this empirical structure and a mathematical structure, not between
two mathematical structures. As Bueno and Colyvan (2011) point out, “[i]t
will be hard to even talk about the empirical setup in question without lean-
ing heavily on the mathematical structure, prior to the immersion step.”
(p. 354). The immersion maps the mathematically represented assumed em-
pirical structure to the mathematical domain.
Our second response to the circularity objection is that it runs the risk
of deeming the mathematization of empirical facts inherently problematic,
unless one is willing to give up on a separation between mathematics and
the world, a position we discuss below in section 2.2.2. We are opposed to
rejecting mathematization, as this amounts to denying a large part of modern
scientific practice.
The objection nevertheless raises an important issue: we have to explain
the value of basing an account of applying mathematics on mappings, because
it seems that mappings can only connect mathematical domains. We will
make an effort to be clear on the question as to what the starting point of
the application process is, viz. how the assumed structure is constituted, and
also to explain why the assumed structure is not mathematical.
The triviality objection. A second objection8 is to deny that there is a prob-
lem here at all, at least from the perspective of scientific realism: of course
can we find objects, relations, structures in the world that are independent
of mathematics and yet can be mapped onto mathematical structures. The
assumed structure problem is a red herring.
This objection only has traction if we adopt a metaphysical reading of
the assumed structure, i.e., if we presuppose that it is unproblematic to
interpret the assumed structure as real, empirical structure that is mapped
8We thank Matthias Egg for raising a form of this objection in the philosophy of science
research seminar in the fall of 2012 in Lausanne.
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to mathematics. However, if it is the goal of, say, a new theory of gravitation
to unveil the real structure of the world, but this theory is not yet available,
how can we take that very structure as a starting point of our investigation?
Saying that the assumed structure is just the structure of the world seems
like begging the question.
When Bueno and Colyvan (2011) write about the assumed structure as
the “relevant bits of the empirical world,” this should not be read metaphys-
ically. We interpret the assumed structure as the reasonable starting point of
the process of applying some specific mathematics. It is not to be confused
with the result of applying that mathematics.
2.2.2. Separating Empirical and Mathematical Domain
The inferential conception presupposes that we can draw a clear distinc-
tion between the mathematical and the empirical domain; otherwise, talk
of a correspondence via mappings between these domains would not make
sense. However, it has been argued in the literature that attempts at drawing
this distinction, say, in terms of the abstract-concrete distinction, are in vain,
see, e.g., Ladyman and Ross (2007, pp. 159), or even that the distinction
between mathematics and the world is blurred, see e.g. French (2000). This
could be taken to threaten the inferential conception, and other accounts
based on mappings.
While we agree that a wholesale solution to the problem of distinguishing
between pure and applied mathematics may not exist, this does not imply
that the distinction can therefore be dismissed, or that no solution exists in
each case. Separating the representation from what is represented is at the
core of many philosophical debates, especially in the philosophy of physics.
To give an example, one of the major problems Einstein faced in the process
of elaborating the general theory of relativity was the correct interpretation
of coordinates. He only overcame these problems after significant struggles
involving the introduction of tensorial methods and the hole argument, which
turns on the question of the relation between space-time points and their
representation.
This shows that, as a matter of fact, while the separation between math-
ematics and the world is not always clear from the beginning, it is part and
parcel of the process of the application of mathematics to make it clear. Giv-
ing up on the separation of the two domains would amount to dismissing this
work. This is not a viable option.
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2.3. The Dynamical Inferential Conception
The inferential conception is a good starting point for a philosophical
understanding of the problem of applying mathematics in the sciences, but
it needs to be extended.
In this section, we introduce the extensions and modifications of the infer-
ential conception. These extensions are designed to accommodate a distinc-
tively historical approach to applying mathematics, i.e., to mirror not only
the result of application, but also the historical process leading to mathe-
matically formulated empirical theories. The extension consists mainly in a
dynamization of the inferential conception. The dynamical inferential con-
ception is a conceptual framework providing us with tools to better under-
stand historical cases.9
Actual historical episodes show that success is not always presupposed
when mathematical concepts, theories, and methods are applied to obtain
an understanding of aspects of the real world. Where and when success was
achieved, it appears from hindsight often as natural or even inevitable. But
closer historical scrutiny of the episodes often reveals complicated equilibra-
tion processes. These are characterized by initial misconceptions, unrecog-
nized insights, dead ends, conceptual revisions. A systematic reason for the
need to equilibrate empirical structure with mathematical structure in the
process of concept formation is the fact that theories of our empirical world
are necessarily grounded on and adapted to limited spheres of empirical expe-
rience. At the same time, in the process of elaborating the theory the limits
of empirical validity are systematically transcended and may conflict with
unexplored phenomena or with realms of the empirical world that are con-
ceptualized by means of a different and independently obtained theoretical
framework. Instances where different fields of phenomena are conceptualized
in different conceptual frameworks which by no means need be compatible are
discussed, e.g., by Peter Galison (1997) under the concept of “trading zones”
and by Ju¨rgen Renn’s (2006) three-partite division of classical physics as the
9Bueno and Colyvan (2011) at least implicitly construe immersion, deduction, and
interpretation steps as temporal; otherwise, talk of a gradual revision process, based on
going back-and-forth between mathematics and the empirical domain, would not make
sense. Although we present the dynamical inferential conception as a framework for the
analysis of historical cases and will illustrate and explicate our conception with a case study
from the history of science, we maintain that the distinctions can also be applied to current
problems of science as a framework to analyze conceptual layers of mathematization.
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Figure 3: In the dynamical inferential conception we distinguish between open and closed
cycles of applying mathematics.
principal challenge for Einstein’s early creative work.
2.3.1. Application Cycles
If we analyze cases of applying mathematics in the history of science, the
smallest unit that is iterated in temporal succession consists of immersion,
deduction and interpretation steps, as laid out in the inferential conception.
We call such a unit a cycle. A cycle is one round of going back-and-forth,
from the world to the mathematics and back to the world, one round of
assimilating a mathematical theory and a particular empirical structure. The
starting point of a cycle is the initial assumed structure, the end point is the
revised assumed structure.
We conceive of the dynamical inferential conception as an account of ap-
plication of mathematics, not an account of successful application of mathe-
matics. The framework encompasses both successful and unsuccessful appli-
cations. Thus, there are two possible outcomes for cycles. We have a closed
cycle if the application is successful. On the other hand, if the application
fails, we are dealing with an open cycle (see also Fig. 3).
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The question whether a cycle is closed or open, i.e., the notion of success,
is relative to the various goals and expectations of the scientists. Researchers
might want to understand a new empirical finding in an established theoret-
ical framework, they might want to explore novel implications of a theory,
they might want to establish links between parts of the conceptual structures,
or explore known propositions and statements of the theory with respect to
their logical dependencies, consistency, or completeness.
The application cycle will often be triggered by a problem that the sci-
entist identifies in the assumed structure. This problem will also prompt a
heuristics, which guides the course of the cycle. The result of an applica-
tion cycle will be compared with the expectations of the solution. It is here
that contradictions between expected results and derived results may man-
ifest themselves. It is also possible that while the result of a cycle matches
with expectations, other parts of the cycle, say, the derivation step, do not
conform with the heuristics.
Once the goal of an application cycle is set, there is a sense in which the
success, or failure, of an application cycle is independent of the scientist’s
persuasion. For example, there can simply be a match or mismatch between
a mathematical structure and the empirical structure it is applied to. We will
call this an objectively closed, or open, cycle. On the other hand, a scientist
can be persuaded, rightly or wrongly, that a cycle is open or closed. For
example, a scientist might commit a mistake in a calculation, which leads
to an open cycle, even though the scientist could close the cycle, were she
to correct the mistake. We will call this kind of cycle subjectively closed
or open. This distinction is particularly important in order to understand
the historical genesis of a mathematized empirical theory. We will point out
what kind of cycle we are dealing with if necessary.
Depending on the nature of the problem, and on the outcome of the ap-
plication cycle, different dynamics are triggered. If the outcome is an open
cycle, i.e., the scientist finds that there is a mismatch between the mathe-
matically derived result and the empirical domain, a process of reflection is
set in motion: The entire pathway of the open cycle is being reconsidered.
The analysis of the cycle is no longer exploratory, but the scientist reflects
on the cycle in order to identify the step that is responsible for the failure.
The failure of the cycle may have occurred at any one, or several, of the
steps along the cycle, and we can use the components of the cycle as a diag-
nostic tool to analyze open cycles, and potentially to overcome the difficulty.
The process of engaging in an application cycle in exploration mode, and
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thereafter in reflection mode, captures real moments of the research process,
but these categories also provide conceptual tools to analyze the historical
process, even if the actors did not perceive their actions in those terms.
There are thus four categories of problems that can underly an objectively
open cycle, i.e. an application cycle which is unsuccessful relative to a certain
goal. These problems correspond to the four components of a cycle.
1. The failure can be due to an inadequate initial assumed structure.
Maybe the empirical phenomena taken as the starting point of the
modeling process have to be investigated more closely, and more data
have to be collected. Maybe it is even necessary to find a different
conceptualization of the empirical phenomena.
2. The failure could be due to the immersion step, or the mathemat-
ical theory we use. The framework could lack the expressive power
for a task, it could be insufficiently understood, or it could exhibit in-
ternal difficulties, or even inconsistencies. In this case, the problem
can be fixed, either by revising, or further exploring, the mathematical
framework, or it could be given up entirely.
3. There could be a failure in the derivation step. Certain inferences can
be hard, or even impossible, to reach, so that it is hard to reconnect the
findings of the deduction step with the world in the interpretation. In
this case, the scientist could make an additional assumption to facilitate
the deduction, search for a different framework, or explore alternative
routes of deduction.
4. There could be a failure in the interpretation step. For example, it
could be unclear whether a solution to some equations has to be inter-
preted realistically, or if it is just a mathematical artifact. It may also
be the case that elements of the mathematical framework are misinter-
preted in their proper reference to elements of the empirical structure.
However, a cycle can also be only subjectively open, for example if the sci-
entist committed a mistake somewhere along the way. One such case occurred
during Einstein’s search for a differential operator for the field equations of
general relativity. Again, the dynamical inferential conception provides a
framework for thinking systematically about application mistakes: we can
locate the mistakes in the components of application cycles. Here are the
different kinds of mistakes that one might commit in a subjectively open
application cycle:
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1. Assumed Structure Mistake: This mistake occurs when there are
wrong expectations about the starting point of an application cycle, or
when there are wrong expectations about the empirical target structure
one expects to recover when completing a cycle.
2. Immersion Step Mistake: This is the mistake of taking some em-
pirical phenomenon and choosing an unsuitable mathematical repre-
sentation for it. It can happen that we have a clear mathematical
counterpart for one empirical object, but that it is unclear as to what
the appropriate representation of other aspects of reality will be. For
example, knowing that the line element represents distances between
space-time points does not solve the problem of how to represent points
of space-time.
3. Deduction Step Mistake: These are mistakes that occur in the de-
duction step, such as errors in calculations or the failure to fully exploit
the deductive possibilities of a mathematical theory.
4. Interpretation Step Mistake: This is the mistake of interpreting a
property of the mathematical formalism a) as a physical property, if
the property is merely an artifact of the formalism, or b) not physical,
even though it is. An important example for our case study are co-
ordinate systems: For a long time, Einstein ascribed an “independent
reality” to them, before he realized that they are, in fact, mere tools of
representation.
If an application cycle is closed, the process of application is not over,
but a different kind of dynamics is set in motion. Usually, a closed cycle
only means that the scientist has successfully derived some consequences
within mathematics that have a meaningful empirical interpretation, not that
there is a full match between the mathematical and empirical structure. The
further goal will normally be to consolidate the closed cycle. Improvements
are possible in all components: the scientist can send the revised assumed
structure back to mathematics in the second cycle, or even widen the scope
of phenomena in the assumed structure, and check whether the cycle can
still be closed; one can work out further deductions and interpretations from
the original immersed structure; the validity of the deductions can still be
checked; and, the interpretation can suggest further empirical investigations,
if it yields novel predictions that have not been anticipated, and so on.
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2.3.2. The Internal Structure and Dynamics of the Two Domains
So far, we have characterized the inferential conception with a focus on the
mappings between the empirical and the mathematical domain, on deriva-
tions for the sake of application, and on how these steps shape the two
domains. By adopting this perspective, we run the risk of construing the two
domains as passive entities that are exclusively shaped by their interaction.
The examination of the historical cases shows that this picture is too
narrow. The two domains evolve over time as a result of processes of equili-
bration between physics and mathematics, but also autonomously. We thus
advocate a dynamical picture of domains. This dynamization is compatible
with the original inferential conception; it extends the view. We will see
in our case study on the general theory of relativity, in section 3.3.3, that
notably the mathematical domain is a dynamical entity.
The fact that the mathematical domain may have a dynamics of its own
draws attention to its internal structure. Mathematics comes in different
layers of theories, where one mathematical theory is more abstract than the
other, and we can apply the former to the latter. This suggests that we get
application cycles of a different kind, which are located at the level of pure
mathematics. We will describe one such cycle in the case study on general
relativity below. While there are parallels between the internal application of
mathematics and the application of mathematics to the world, there are good
reasons to keep these cases separate. The most important difference between
the two cases is that there is no assumed structure, and no assumed structure
problem, in mathematics; there are only morphisms between mathematical
structures.
Examining the internal dynamics of mathematics forces us to be specific
about the mathematical theory that is applied, both within mathematics
and to the world. Formulating the problem of applicability of mathematics
in generic categories of mathematics and the empirical world presents the
problem in a way that is too coarse-grained. Each and every case of applying
mathematics is a case of applying a specific piece of mathematics. Also,
even if the kind of morphism used in the immersion or interpretation step is
specified, this need not determine the mathematical theory that is applied,
especially if it is possible to interpret one mathematical theory in terms of
another—think of a calculus with and without “intended interpretation.”
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3. The Case of General Relativity
We now put the dynamical inferential conception to work in our historical
case study, an episode from the genesis of the general theory of relativity. We
will first sketch the state of play at the beginning of the search for GR, in
the period before the absolute differential calculus of Tullio Levi-Civita and
Gregorio Ricci-Curbastro (1901) was applied to GR, and provide a short
overview of the evolution of the theory up to that point. We will then
reconstruct the application of this mathematical theory, in the framework of
the dynamical inferential conception.
3.1. Initiating the Search for a Relativistic Theory of Gravitation
The search for a new—or revised—theory of gravitation was triggered
by the conflict between special relativity (SR), which postulates a finite,
constant speed of light c, and Newtonian Gravitational Theory (NGT), which
implies an instantaneous propagation of gravitational effects. These two
conceptualizations of partly distinct physical domains were inconsistent and
had to be reconciled.
While the inconsistency is rooted in physical principles, it carries over to
a formal inconsistency between the respective mathematical formulations of
the two theories: NGT in its received form does not conform to the formal
requirement imposed by SR, Lorentz covariance. Therefore, the mathemat-
ical formulation of the theories had to be adapted. This set the process of
the application of mathematics in motion. However, it was not clear whether
radical changes in the mathematics, or even the application of a new kind of
mathematics would be necessary, or whether a more conservative revision of
NGT was sufficient.
Historically, various theoreticians were working on this problem in the pe-
riod between the establishment of SR and the advent of GR, i.e., in the decade
between 1905 and 1915. There were proposals by Hermann Minkowski and
Henri Poincare´ to find force laws that would be Lorentz covariant and exhibit
a finite propagation speed of electrodynamic interaction, as well as attempts
to formulate field theoretical modifications of gravitation, as proposed, e.g.,
by Max Abraham; see Renn and Schemmel (2007a,b).10
10Other relevant developments were oblique to these dates and events, e.g. attempts
at modifying the theory of gravitation pre-1905, motivated by finding a field theory of
gravitation in analogy to electrodynamic field theory, or by finding modified force laws,
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The historical starting point of Einstein’s investigations were the two the-
ories that triggered the search for a relativistic theory of gravitation: SR on
the one hand, and NGT on the other. Within the framework of the dynam-
ical inferential conception, these two theories capture the initial assumed
structure at the beginning of the application cycles leading to GR. The ini-
tial assumed structure thus already came in mathematical form. This was to
be expected, because once physical theories have reached a certain degree of
sophistication, we do not start from scratch, but we pick up the construction
of the theory mid-stream.11
At this point, we want to be careful to keep apart the assumed structure,
i.e., the empirical phenomena described by a theory, and the mathematical
formulation of the same theory. At the same time, the theories do not capture
all relevant empirical phenomena—this motivates the distinction between
empirical domain and assumed structure. Additionally, the different theories
constituting the assumed structure exhibit inconsistencies, and play different
roles in the heuristics of the application process. We will now spell out these
points for the case at hand.
First, what empirical phenomena are captured by the two theories? Spe-
cial relativity arose from a reflection on properties of electrodynamic field
theory. It was then generalized to a restriction on any physical theory, such
as thermodynamics or classical mechanics. The restriction was formulated
in terms of restrictions on the mathematical formulation of physical theo-
ries: Their laws had to be formulated in a Lorentz covariant way. Newtonian
mechanics, on the other hand, had been a foundational theory for centuries
with an elaborate mathematical formulation. But with the advent of electro-
dynamic field theory, it became a theory of a restricted domain of physical
phenomena. It deals with the motion of massive bodies moving in space un-
der the influence of the gravitational force, such as the motion of the planets
around the sun, and falling bodies on earth.
There were two lines of conflict between the two theories. First, NGT
was well confirmed for small velocities. This was not true for velocities ap-
proaching the speed of light, where the inconsistency with SR may become
apparent. Second, some isolated gravitational phenomena, in particular the
motivated by electrodynamics force laws (Weber-like laws), or motivated, in either case,
by empirical anomalies (Mercury perihelion advance); see Renn and Schemmel (2007a,b).
11The fact that the assumed structure may come in mathematical form has already been
pointed out by Bueno and Colyvan (2011); see the discussion in section 2.2.1 above.
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anomalous perihelion advance of Mercury, could not be explained within the
theoretical framework of NGT unless one imposes ad hoc assumptions. It
was known for quite some time that NGT alone could not account for this
anomaly, which is also a gravitational phenomenon; see Newcomb (1895);
Rosevaere (1982); Earman and Janssen (1993).
These two lines of conflict did not yield equal reactions. The first short-
coming was at the center of Einstein’s attention. The conflict between SR
and NGT necessitated the search for GR, and it was one of the main goals of
the new theory to remove the internal inconsistency between the two theories.
The second line of conflict did not trigger the construction process of general
relativity. The empirically observed motion of Mercury—the anomalous ad-
vance of its orbit—was part of the empirical domain, but it was not part of the
assumed structure. It could not be reproduced by applying the mathematics
of NGT. The assumed structure thus contained a part that would be inter-
preted as Mercury’s orbit (a deduced function) but that function was known
to be inconsistent with empirical data (numerical values empirically associ-
ated with the arguments of the deduced function). The mismatch between
the theoretically obtained planetary orbit, which was part of the assumed
structure, and the empirically observed orbit, which was part of the rele-
vant empirical domain, played a different role in application. The function
of the empirical observation was that of a test, it entered the construction
process as part of the heuristics, providing a goal for the mathematical de-
duction. One criterion for a closed application cycle would be to see whether
the mathematical structure, into which one would map the assumed struc-
ture in the immersion step, could account for the correct numerical value of
the perihelion advance, after mapping back to the empirical domain in the
interpretation step.
NGT was the part of the initial assumed structure responsible for the in-
consistency: it was empirically falsified, and it was in theoretical competition
with special-relativistic electrodynamic field theory. Therefore, NGT was in
need of revision. There are systematic reasons for taking NGT as a starting
point. Those reasons have to do with the heuristic “correspondence princi-
ple,” one of the guiding requirements identified by Renn and Sauer (1999) as
shaping the search for GR. According to the correspondence principle, the
new theory should reproduce NGT in a special-relativistic, weak-field limit,
such that the empirical knowledge embodied in NGT would be recovered.
The heuristic requirement of a Newtonian limit therefore played an impor-
tant role: it guaranteed that the new theory would be empirically adequate,
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at least to the same extent as NGT, and the empirical adequacy of the new
theory would not have to be demonstrated from scratch. Building the old
theory into the new one was not only a theoretical requirement: The speci-
fication of a certain limit for the recovery of NGT opened up the possibility
of revising the assumed structure in regions where the premises of that limit
would no longer hold.
This concludes our characterization of the initial assumed structure of
general relativity. Now we will sketch how the initial assumed structure was
refined before the absolute differential calculus came into play.
3.2. The Genesis of General Relativity: A Drama in Three Acts
Following John Stachel (2007), we can conceive of the genesis of GR
as a drama in three acts. In the first act, Einstein (1907) formulated the
“equivalence hypothesis,” the assumption that there is a complete physi-
cal equivalence between a frame of reference moving in constant, rectilinear
relative acceleration to some inertial frame, and an acceleration-free frame
endowed with a static, homogeneous gravitational field. The equivalence hy-
pothesis was a heuristic tool that allowed Einstein to analyze properties of
gravitational fields using coordinate transformation between moving frames
of reference. He derived three physical consequences of his hypothesis: grav-
itational red shift, gravitational light bending, and the gravitational mass
of energy. In the second act, Einstein realized that a proper mathematical
representation of a relativistic theory of gravitation would have to be based
on a second-rank, symmetric tensor field, the metric, which expressed prop-
erties of space-time and of the gravitational potential. In order to fulfill
this function, the metric had to be non-Euclidean. The fact that the metric
would play a prominent role prompted the question as to how it would be
determined by a relativistic field equation; this is the starting point of act
three. Fortunately, we have insight into act three, the search for the rela-
tivistic field equation, by way of a significant historical document, Einstein’s
Zurich notebook, which has been subject of intense historical investigation;
see Renn (2007). For a while, Einstein settled on a system of gravitational
field equations that is not generally covariant, and worked in a state of sus-
pense, until he finally achieved the breakthrough to full general covariance
in late 1915, in hectic competition with the world’s leading mathematician,
David Hilbert; see Sauer (1999).
The episode on which we will focus here belongs to the third act, the
search for a relativistic field equation. However, before zooming in on an
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analysis of this episode in terms of the dynamical inferential conception, we
want to add some comments on the first two acts.
In the first act, sophisticated mathematical concepts and methods were
introduced by other protagonists, notably by Minkowski (1908), who refor-
mulated the original theory of SR in a formal, four-dimensional represen-
tation, drawing on mathematical traditions of matrix theory introduced by
Arthur Cayley. Initially, Einstein was sceptic towards these mathematical
reformulations, until he was confronted with their advantages in a compet-
itive encounter with Max Abraham, one of the proponents of sophisticated
mathematical methods in theoretical physics.12
For our purposes, two results of the encounter are significant. First, it
made Einstein realize the expressive and inferential power of mathematical
structures in theory construction. Second, more concretely, it showed that,
in the context of a relativistic theory of gravitation based on the equivalence
hypothesis, Minkowski’s invariant spacetime interval had to be taken in dif-
ferential form if the velocity of light c was no longer a constant. As a further
consequence, it became clear that the differential line element with variable
c actually transcended Lorentz covariance. However, this insight also paved
the way for the use of a general differential line element. This would prove to
be significant in the second act, where the metric tensor suddenly appeared
on stage as a major character for the remainder of the drama.
Another important development of the first act concerns the representa-
tion of the source of the gravitational field. In NGT, the source is the mass
density, a scalar field. Again, physical and mathematical considerations in
the elaboration of SR transformed the source of the gravitation field into
a second-rank symmetric tensor, the stress-energy-momentum tensor, com-
prising mass-energy density, momentum flux, as well as stresses as physical
quantities which all contribute to the generation of a gravitational field.
With the appearance of the metric tensor, on the one hand, and the
energy-momentum tensor, on the other, the classical Poisson equation, which
defined their relationship, had to be transformed as well. This is what trig-
gered the dynamics of the episode to which we will now turn.
12Einstein’s scalar theory of gravitation of early 1912 and the encounter with Abraham
play an important role in the genesis of GR. This episode can itself be analyzed in terms
of the dynamical inferential conception; see Ra¨z and Sauer, manuscript in preparation.
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3.3. The Absolute Differential Calculus: A New Kind of Mathematics
In this section, we apply the dynamical inferential conception to one of
the most interesting episodes in the genesis of GR, the collaboration of Ein-
stein with his “mathematician friend,” Marcel Grossmann, on the so-called
Entwurf (“outline”) theory of gravitation in 1912–13, the immediate pre-
cursor theory of final general relativity.13 The collaboration began at some
time in late summer 1912 when Einstein tried to generalize the equivalence
principle to reference frames of arbitrary acceleration, but faced mathemat-
ical difficulties. Legend has it that in a state of desperation, he turned to
Marcel Grossmann, his good friend from student days and now professor of
geometry at the ETH Zurich. Grossmann identified the absolute differential
calculus, an early version of tensor calculus, as a mathematical theory that
might solve Einstein’s problems. Together, Einstein and Grossmann refor-
mulated gravitational theory in this new framework, and published the first
tensorial formulation of a generalized theory of relativity, which champions
all essential elements of the final theory of general relativity, except for the
correct gravitational field equations.
The episode is a particularly interesting case of the application of math-
ematics for the following reasons. First, the mathematics applied in the
Entwurf, the absolute differential calculus, was developed independently of
the particular physical problem at hand, gravitational theory. This sets it
apart from the previous application cycles. Because of this feature, it has
been discussed as an example of the “unreasonable effectiveness” of mathe-
matics; see Steiner (1998). Secondly, at this stage of history, the division of
labour between mathematics and physics is discernible at several levels. Both
protagonists of the episode, Einstein and Grossmann, had clearly defined
competences and tasks: Einstein initiated the collaboration and brought the
physical motivation and knowledge to the table. Grossmann’s competence
was in finding a theory that solved a clearly-formulated mathematical prob-
lem. This division of labour carries over to the resulting joint publication.
The Entwurf paper has two parts: Einstein was responsible for the first,
physical part, while Grossmann was responsible for the second, mathemati-
13The Einstein-Grossmann theory is often referred to in the literature as the Entwurf
theory with reference to Einstein’s and Grossmann’s first joint publication, entitled “Out-
line (Entwurf ) of a generalized relativity theory and a theory of gravitation” (Einstein and
Grossmann, 1913). For a detailed account of their collaboration and Grossmann’s role in
it; see Sauer (2014).
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cal part. Third, the case is interesting because Einstein and Grossmann were
not yet able to carry out the application process to their satisfaction, as the
main application cycle remained open. The characterization of the theory as
an Entwurf proved to be justified, as the Entwurf field equations turned out
to be wrong in the end.
3.3.1. Assumed Structure
Since the inception of the drama of GR in 1907, the assumed structure
had been substantially revised when Einstein and Grossmann began their
collaboration in 1912. Einstein’s goal, at the beginning of act three, was to
find relativistic field equations of gravitation, i.e., an equation of the form
OP (POT ) = SOURCE. (1)
This is a so-called “frame,” a template that can be instantiated in different
ways depending on the context; see (Renn and Sauer, 2007, p. 127). Its
instances are differential equations which determine a potential (POT) from
a distribution of sources (SOURCE) by way of a differential equation which
arises from a differential operator (OP) acting on the potential. Examples are
the electrostatic Poisson equation, determining the electrostatic potential ϕe
as a function of the charge density ρe, or the inhomogeneous wave equation for
the electromagnetic four-potential Aµ where the source is given by the four-
current jµ. At the beginning of the search for GR, the frame was instantiated
by the gravitational Poisson equation, at its end it would be transformed into
the Einstein equations. In 1912, two of the three components of the frame had
been generalized. The SOURCE slot was filled with the energy-momentum
(EM) tensor Tµν , and the POT slot was filled with the space-time metric gµν .
The remaining task was to find, and examine, suitable candidates for OP,
the differential operator acting on the metric.
3.3.2. Immersion Mapping
The immersion mapping connects the initial assumed structure with the
mathematical domain. In this case, the immersion hinged on a reinterpreta-
tion of the differential line element. The expression
ds2 = gµνdx
µdxν , (2)
where gµν denotes the metric tensor, had been generated in the physical do-
main as a result of previous application cycles. By embedding it into the
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mathematical domain, it was now being stripped of its physical significance,
and reinterpreted as the symbolic expression of a differential line element.
This change of perspective established a connection to the theory of differ-
ential invariants. The goal of the immersion step was to find differential
operators that could enter into the field equation. The mathematical object
that had to be carried along in the immersion, to be generalized in the math-
ematical domain, was the Laplace operator. Thus, the main task was to find
differential operators acting on the gµν . The physically motivated heuristics
translates into the search for a mathematical theory that provides covariants
of a homogeneous quadratic differential form.
Einstein’s formulation of the task in the Entwurf paper makes it clear that
the requirements on a suitable differential operator are tentative in character
and potentially subject to revision:
In accordance with [the Poisson equation], one is inclined to
require that [the new relativistic field equation] be of order two.
However, it has to be emphasized that it proved to be impossible
to find a differential equation that satisfies this requirement, is a
generalization of [the Laplace operator], and is tensorial for arbi-
trary transformations. A priori we cannot exclude that the final,
exact equations of gravitation are of order bigger than two. [...]
The attempt of a discussion of such possibilities, however, would
be premature in view of our present knowledge of the physical
properties of the gravitational field (Einstein and Grossmann,
1913, p. 233).
We can extract a list of requirements, Einstein’s “check list” for differen-
tial operators, from the above quote:
1. The operator should be of order two.
2. It should be invariant under transformations larger than the Lorentz
group.
3. It should be a generalization of the Laplace operator.
The first is a heuristic requirement derived from the Poisson equation. It
had no conclusive justification, but was based on an analogy with the classical
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case. The second is based on the principle of “generalized relativity”.14 The
third, finally, is grounded in the correspondence principle.
Mark Steiner (1998, pp. 94) discusses the use of analogies in the discov-
ery of the equations of GR, and specifically addresses the first requirement.
Citing Graves (1971, p. 178), he claims that there is no physical justification
for this choice, but these conditions were simply adopted from the Poisson
equation. He claims that “the analogy with the Poisson equation was a
Pythagorean analogy”, an analogy which proceeds by using some mathemat-
ical property of an equation, for which there is, at the time of the discovery,
no physical justification. This, however, seems to be overreaching. First,
the use of the Poisson equation is justified by the correspondence principle.
Furthermore, some properties of the Poisson equation do play a role here.
The associated Green’s function maps back to the Newtonian gravitational
potential, and for physical reasons, one would expect second-order differen-
tial equations of motion to hold, which require initial conditions of position
and velocity, and nothing more. Therefore, in the absence of theoretical rea-
sons to go beyond second-order terms, there is no physical reason to look
for higher-order differential equations, either on the level of the equations of
motion, or the level of the field equation.
Most of the specifications for the differential operators were extracted
from the Poisson equation. The requirement of a wider covariance group,
on the other hand, was new. Unfortunately, the available historical sources
concerning this issue are much too vague on this point: we do not know
how exactly Einstein formulated the quest for candidate differential operators
when he approached Grossmann for help, so it is not clear whether he thought
that general covariance was required, or if he had only a vague idea that the
covariance group should be expanded, and Grossmann filled in the details
later.15 There are later recollections of the precise formulation of Einstein’s
question, but such later accounts, as always, have to be taken with a lot of
caution.
14This principle suggests generalizing the idea, from SR, that there are no privileged
inertial frames, to non-inertial frames. In this sense, the principle has to do with the
question as to which properties of space-time should be accepted a priori. For Einstein, the
requirement to generalize SR was closely related to finding an appropriate mathematical
description of gravitation that was independent of the chosen coordinate system.
15See Sauer (2014) for a detailed discussion of this question.
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3.3.3. The Mathematical Domain
The target of the immersion step is the mathematical domain, one or
more mathematical theories with more or less worked out rules of inference
embodied by rules of transformation and manipulation for symbol systems.
The mathematical domain helps representing the structure immersed into it,
but it can have surplus structure. The mathematical domain should also not
be conflated with the deduction step. The mathematical domain is a general
framework which provides a space of possible structures and deductions,
while the deduction step is geared towards a specific goal of application.
According to the inferential conception, the next step in the application
process is the derivation step: once a part of the empirical domain is repre-
sented as a mathematical structure, we use a mathematical theory to gain
knowledge about this structure. However, we think that at this junction, the
inferential conception in its simple form is too coarse-grained and requires
further refinement. It leaves out important aspects of the application pro-
cess. It may not be possible to simply use an existing mathematical theory
in the derivation step. A considerable effort may be involved in making a
mathematical theory applicable.
This point emerges from a closer look at the present episode. The main
difference between the previous application cycles and the present one is that
here, an existing, more or less worked out mathematical theory, the ADC,
is put to work in the context of gravitation for the first time. The novel
application of a mathematical theory is one of the more puzzling aspects of
applicability, so we want to be particularly careful in our examination of how
it works.16
A mathematical theory can be more or less suitable for a particular appli-
cation, it can contribute to its own application more or less successfully, and
it can be modified so as to enhance its applicability. We can distinguish two
aspects of the contribution of a mathematical theory towards application: it
can be implemented before, and after, the mathematical theory is actually
applied to a particular empirical domain. We will call the first case “prior,”
and the second case “posterior” contributions of mathematics to application.
The “prior” contributions of mathematical theories to application are
16Steiner (2005, Par. II) calls this “non-canonical empirical applications,” empirical
application in a context for which the mathematics was not devised; Steiner classifies the
application of non-Euclidean geometry in GR as non-canonical.
29
those aspects that are regulated by considerations within pure mathematics,
and general considerations about the potential application of the mathemat-
ical theory before the application of the mathematical theory to any partic-
ular empirical domain. In order to understand the prior contributions in the
present case, we have to examine the evolution of the mathematical theory
before its application to gravitation.
The “posterior” contributions, on the other hand, have to do with the
adaptation of the mathematical theory to a particular empirical domain.
They are not part of the derivation step, properly speaking, but prepare the
ground for this step. In the present case, Grossmann’s contributions pertain
to this aspect. Did Grossmann adapt, change, or extend the existing math-
ematics in order to make it applicable? Did he make original contributions
to the applied mathematics?
The mathematical theories in the Entwurf. Before we turn to a discussion
about the prior and posterior contributions of mathematics, we have to de-
termine which mathematical theories are actually applied in the Entwurf,
and what the relative importance of these theories is.17
In the mathematical part of the Entwurf, Grossmann cites the follow-
ing works: Christoffel (1869), Bianchi and Lukat (1899), Riemann (1876),
Ricci and Levi-Civita (1901), Kottler (1912). In addition, there are refer-
ences to Minkowski (1908), Sommerfeld (1910a,b), and Laue (1913). The
latter are formal reformulations of special relativity using four-dimensional
notation, four-dimensional vector algebra and calculus. Although these re-
searchers have a background in mathematics, their works are not themselves
mathematical. We therefore concentrate on the references that cite genuine
mathematical contributions. It is notable that Abraham’s work is not ex-
plicitly mentioned.
Not all of these mathematical sources are equally important. Based on
Grossmann’s citations, and on a comparison of the notation used by Gross-
mann and the mathematical sources, the works by Christoffel, Bianchi, and
Ricci-Curbastro and Levi-Civita stand out as particularly important. Kot-
tler’s work is probably mentioned only to avoid a priority dispute. Finally,
17The question as to what the most important mathematical tradition for the genesis of
GR was, has been debated in the historical literature; see e.g. Reich (1994); Stachel (2007).
Ra¨z (2013, Ch. 6) discusses the influences of the mathematical sources on Grossmann’s
part of the Entwurf.
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an analysis of Grossmann’s reference to Riemann suggests that Grossmann
did not consult Riemann’s work directly, and that the latter’s influence was
much less important than talk of the role of Riemannian geometry for GR
suggests.18
The influence of Ricci and Levi-Civita (1901) on Grossmann and Einstein
is well known: Ricci and Levi-Civita provided Grossmann with a worked out
calculus, on which he drew freely. Their paper has survey character, and
Grossmann may have used it as an entry point into the mathematical prob-
lems at hand. On the other hand, the importance of Christoffel (1869) for
Grossmann cannot be overemphasized. To give but one example, Grossmann
did not use the notation provided by Ricci and Levi-Civita for the most part,
but he went back to Christoffel’s notation. A parallel reading of Grossmann,
Christoffel, and Bianchi is also instructive. Bianchi and Lukat (1899) is a
textbook on differential geometry. However, Grossmann only used chapter
2, which is a “service chapter,” introducing, among other things, what we
now call Christoffel symbols and the Riemann tensor. Bianchi’s presentation
follows Christoffel’s paper up to notational details, and presents Christoffel’s
innovations in an accessible manner.19
If we put these lines of influence together, the following picture emerges,
see Fig. 4. Grossmann largely drew on the tradition of (algebraic) invariant
theory, or theory of differential invariants, initiated by Christoffel (1869),
and worked out by Bianchi and Lukat (1899), on the one hand, and Ricci
and Levi-Civita (1901), on the other. The focus was on the abstract calcu-
lus, and some particular problems, such as the equivalence of homogeneous
quadratic differential forms. The geometrical interpretation of some of the
novel concepts, such as the Riemann tensor, was not yet fully worked out,
but known only in special cases—the Riemann tensor reduces to Gaussian
curvature in two dimensions—the explicit geometrical interpretation of ho-
mogeneous quadratic differential forms as space-time metric is an exception.
The mathematical theory employed at this stage was not differential geome-
18Grossmann probably “lifted” the reference from Ricci and Levi-Civita (1901): The
reference Grossmann gives is faulty—the page number is wrong—and the identical fault
can be found in a relevant passage of Ricci and Levi-Civita (1901). As we know that
Grossmann drew heavily on the latter source, it is plausible that he just copied the mis-
take, and may not actually have consulted Riemann’s work at the time of composing the
Entwurf ; see Ra¨z (2013, Sec. 6.3) for the full argument.
19We also observe that Grossmann was Christoffel’s successor at the Zurich Polytechnic.
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Christoffel 1869
Transformation
Ricci Levi-Cività 
1901 ADC
Riemann 1876
Werke 1st edition
Riemann 1867
Habilitation
Bianchi-Lukat 1899 
DG 1st edition
Grossmann 1913
Entwurf part 2
Kottler 1912
Figure 4: The relative importance of the mathematical sources cited in Grossmann’s part
of the Entwurf. The sources are vertically in temporal order. Arrows indicate direct
citation. Grossmann’s three most important sources are indicated with bold arrows. The
dashed line to Riemann (1876) indicates that the citation may have been taken from Ricci
and Levi-Civita (1901) and hence may not have exerted a direct influence; see the text for
further explanation.
try, as witnessed by the minor direct influence of Riemann (1876).20
Prior contributions: From Christoffel to the ADC. Let us turn to the prior
contributions of pure mathematics, the internal dynamics of mathematics
towards application. In the previous section, we have identified the relevant
mathematical sources prior to their application to gravitational theory. On
closer inspection, these sources display a tendency within mathematics that
is relevant for the problem of applicability. By comparing the sources in
question, we can discern an effort of some mathematicians to make their
theories applicable. This can be seen by comparing Christoffel’s (1869) paper,
on the one hand, and Ricci and Levi-Civita’s (1901) on the other.
20This conclusion is in concordance with Karin Reich’s (1992) observation that Rieman-
nian geometry lacked the central concept of parallel transport until after Einstein’s final
formulation of general relativity when the concept of affine connection was introduced into
Riemannian geometry by Hermann Weyl and Tullio Levi-Civita.
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Christoffel’s is a technical paper in algebraic invariant theory, solving the
equivalence problem of homogeneous quadratic differential forms. It specifies
algebraic conditions under which two such differential forms are “essentially
the same”, i.e., can be transformed into each other by coordinate transfor-
mations. This problem is directly relevant for Grossmann’s problem: the
differential invariants emerging from Christoffel’s solution are candidates for
the left hand side of the field equations. However, Christoffel’s presentation
is not easily accessible; his main goal is to solve an abstract, mathematical
problem, his solution is cast in a cumbersome technical notation. The goal
of the paper is not to provide a readily applicable tool.
Ricci and Levi-Civita’s paper is entirely different. It advertises the tech-
niques invented by Christoffel, and explicitly aims at a wide audience of
mathematicians and physicists. Christoffel’s and other mathematicians’ ideas
are turned into a calculus, giving novel interpretations to the symbolism, and
suggesting various possible applications. The paper has the goal of presenting
everything in an accessible, yet general manner. Ricci and Levi-Civita write
in the introduction that the paper should make it easier for practitioners to
get familiar with the methods of a calculus that is independent of particular
coordinate systems.
This shows that mathematicians do not only strive to solve abstract math-
ematical problems irrespective of application. There is a distinct tendency
within pure mathematics to work towards an application of mathematical
theories. If we extend this perspective to Riemann’s seminal geometrical
work, we get a picture of application cycles that are entirely within mathe-
matics: Riemann’s work, which generalized Gauss’s work on two-dimensional
surfaces to arbitrary dimensions, is a motivation for Christoffel’s even more
abstract and general work on differential forms, which, in turn, is taken up
and transformed by Ricci and Levi-Civita, and applied back to differential
geometry by Bianchi and later contributors, closing the application cycle.
Mathematics has its own, internal dynamics of application.
Posterior contributions: adapting the new mathematics. Grossmann’s contri-
butions to the mathematics of GR, as we find them in the Entwurf, encompass
a spectrum. They range from identifying the appropriate mathematical liter-
ature, theories, and concepts, as we have seen, to notational innovations, the
reinterpretation of existing concepts, the introduction of new concepts, and
the generation of new mathematical results. These are all contributions that
stay within the mathematical domain and are relevant to the mathematical
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theory itself. Grossmann’s contributions are aimed at, but not restricted to,
the application to GR.
We can divide Grossmann’s part of the Entwurf into two parts. The first
three paragraphs are an exposition of what we would now call tensor calculus,
an exploration of a mathematical theory, not particularly geared towards any
specific application. It is only in paragraph four that specific derivations are
carried out, and the theory is put to work for the theory of gravitation. These
two parts mirror our distinction between Grossmann’s posterior contributions
to the development of mathematics, and the deduction steps of cycles in the
mathematical domain, properly speaking.
Superficially viewed, Grossmann’s exposition of tensor calculus in the
first part only pulls together the necessary concepts that were provided by
the ADC. On closer inspection, Grossmann introduced quite some changes
in comparison to the original ADC. They provide his posterior contribu-
tions. First, Grossmann introduced a change in notation, which may seem
odd from our modern perspective. While Ricci and Levi-Civita had denoted
their co- and contravariant “systems” by subscript and superscript indices,
respectively, Grossmann wrote all indices as subscripts and denoted the char-
acter of covariance or contravariance by using Latin or Greek characters for
the tensor symbol itself. From a modern perspective, Grossmann’s change
in notation seems like a step in the wrong direction. However, Ricci and
Levi-Civita never considered the possibility of a mixed tensor, i.e., one that
carries both covariant and contravariant indices. Grossmann, on the other
hand, explicitly introduced tensors of mixed transformation behavior by us-
ing Gothic characters instead of Latin or Greek ones, and by separating the
co- and contravariant indices with a little vertical line.21 Second, Grossmann
introduced new terminology. He referred to Ricci’s and Levi-Civita’s “sys-
tems” as “tensors,” thus reinterpreting one purely mathematical concept in
terms of another mathematical concept that had already been endowed with
a physical interpretation. Third, Grossmann also contributed new results
21It could be speculated that the generalization of a mathematical concept, viz. the
introduction of mixed tensors, reversed a previous notational innovation, the position
system for indices, because it was not clear (to Grossmann) whether and how the notation
could be consistently generalized along with the concept. Ricci and Levi-Civita, on the
other hand, did not anticipate the usefulness of mixed tensors; they may have considered
the concept overly general. Its introduction was only properly justified by the application
in GR.
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to pure mathematics; most importantly, his proofs that Beltrami parameters
(differential operators), and generalizations thereof, can be given a particular
form, that is useful to prove, say, the energy-momentum balance equation.
The application of the ADC to a relativistic theory of gravity left its traces
in the mathematical domain: the reinterpretation of mathematical notions,
such as Ricci and Levi-Civita’s (1901) co- and contravariant “systems” as
tensors, which was a physical concept previously, the introduction of new
concepts that are needed in application, such as mixed tensors and the Ricci
tensor; new notation that is motivated or necessitated by the application,
such as the distinction between co- and contravariant and mixed tensors
using different kinds of letters. Many, but not all of these innovations are
now standard in tensor calculus.
3.3.4. Three Cycles of Applying Mathematics
The fourth paragraph of Grossmann’s part of the Entwurf is divided
into three subsections, each presenting the details of a specific mathematical
argument, or derivation. In view of the dynamical inferential conception,
each of these three parts corresponds to a cycle, the first and third to a
closed cycle, the second to an open cycle. We will comment on each of these
cycles separately.
It is not surprising that the application of the ADC in GR encompasses
more than one cycle, i.e., that the mathematical theory is applied to more
than one particular physical problem. Up to this point, it was one problem
that pushed Einstein and Grossmann towards the application of the ADC:
the generalization of the differential operator acting on the metric. However,
once the ADC was established as a more or less suitable tool for this task,
the mathematical theory offered itself as a framework in which other aspects
of physics could be reformulated as well – mathematics pulled in further
applications, so to speak. One such problem is the reformulation of energy
conservation, the first cycle to be discussed below.
The three cycles we find in Grossmann’s part of the Entwurf encompass
immersion, deduction, and interpretation steps. The deduction step, one of
the focal points of the inferential conception, takes place within the math-
ematical domain. In this step, we draw on a calculus in order to extract
information about the mathematical structure in question. These inference
rules can be implicit or explicit, and are ideally, but not necessarily, deduc-
tive. Material aspects, such as notation, become important, because these
can influence how easy or difficult it is to draw inferences—typically these
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difficulties only become apparent at this stage of concrete operation within
the mathematical domain to achieve a certain deduction. In the interpreta-
tion step, some of the results of the deduction step are mapped back to the
empirical domain, and compared either with empirical results or theoretical
background knowledge. This step is not purely mathematical, as empiri-
cal and other theoretical considerations come into play—the results of the
deduction are brought into contact with the assumed structure.
The first cycle. In the first argument, Grossmann shows that the energy-
momentum conservation equation∑
νn
∂
∂xn
(√−g gmνΘνn)− 1
2
∑
µν
√−g ∂gµν
∂xm
Θµν = 0, (3)
is covariant under arbitrary coordinate transformations. Here Θµν denotes
the contravariant energy-momentum tensor, and g the determinant of the
metric tensor. Grossmann’s result is appreciated by noting that if we de-
note the covariant energy-momentum tensor by Tµν , covariant differentiation
by separating the relevant index with a semicolon, and use the summation
convention, eq. (3) translates, in modern notation, to the familiar covariant
divergence of the tensor density Tnm =
√−g T nm,
Tnm;n = 0. (4)
This result was important because it established that the conservation prin-
ciple could be written in generally covariant form—the goal of the cycle is to
generalize an existing result.
In the interpretation step, Einstein interpreted eq. (3) as a continuity
equation for the energy (m = 4) and momentum density (m = 1, 2, 3) by
reading the first term as a divergence and the second term as expressing the
effect of the gravitational force, represented by the derivative of the metric,
acting on the energy-momentum content. While the structure in question,
the energy-momentum tensor, had been derived from special-relativistic prin-
ciples, the general covariance of the generalized energy-momentum balance
equation could only be derived using the deductive possibilities provided by
the ADC and by Grossmann’s preliminary work. Grossmann used the ADC,
as well as some of his own results, on the form of differential operators, which
he had elaborated in paragraph 2 of his part.
This is an example of a closed cycle. Grossmann succeeded in showing
that the energy-momentum balance equation is of generally covariant form,
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as was expected on the grounds of the generalized relativity principle. In
establishing this result, he had made substantial use of mathematical proper-
ties of the tensor calculus, such as the preservation of the property of general
covariance under operations of covariant differentiation. The fact that the
cycle was closed, in turn, strengthened the strategy of applying advanced
mathematics in the search for a general relativistic theory of gravitation.
The second cycle. From the point of view of the dynamical inferential con-
ception, Einstein’s and Grossmann’s search for a suitable instantiation of
the OP slot is an instructive and relevant example of an open application
cycle, as it was their original goal to formulate a generally covariant theory
of gravitation.
The deduction step of this cycle has two parts. First, Grossmann noted
that under the heuristic requirements specified in the immersion step, the
Riemann-Christoffel22 tensor is the differential operator from which all other
possible operators that could enter into the field equation can be generated by
algebraic operations. Historically, this is Grossmann’s most important con-
tribution to the genesis of GR. This step cannot be overestimated. Reinter-
preting the spatio-temporal distance ds2 between neighboring events, given
in eq. (2), as a differential line-element brings to bear on the problem the
rich resources of an elaborated mathematical theory of differential invariants.
However, this approach was not yet carried out successfully in the Entwurf.
To a certain degree, the same may be said of the concepts of space-time
metric and manifold. It is here that these concepts were put to work for the
first time in the context of gravitational theory, but their ramifications and
geometrical interpretations had not yet been explored.
Second, Grossmann invoked inferential rules provided by the ADC, car-
rying out concrete formal operations on the level of the symbolic represen-
tation, in order to create an object whose representations conformed with
the constraints of the field equation frame and its given instantiations. More
specifically, the instantiation of the SOURCE slot of the frame (1) of the
gravitational field equation by the energy-momentum tensor, a second-rank
22From here on, we will follow Einstein, as e.g. in Einstein and Fokker (1914, pp. 325,
328), Einstein (1914, pp. 1053, 1080), in referring to what is now commonly called the
Riemann tensor as the Riemann-Christoffel tensor. By adopting this terminology we do
not wish to make a statement on priority but simply to indicate our claim that for Einstein
and Grossmann, the source of the expression is Christoffel’s work.
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tensor, created a constraint on the possible instantiations of the OP slot,
which also needed to be a second-rank tensor. Grossmann therefore ap-
plied the covariant operation of a contraction to the fourth-rank Riemann-
Christoffel tensor, which produced a second-rank tensor. He thereby created
a new mathematical object, the Ricci tensor. The Ricci tensor did not figure
in the original ADC as presented in Ricci and Levi-Civita (1901). It appears
that Ricci (1904) had already considered what is now called the Ricci tensor,
but we have no evidence that Grossmann knew of Ricci’s paper; we assume
that he found this result on his own. We know from the analysis of the
Zurich notebook that Grossmann and Einstein considered further methods
of constructing second-rank tensors from the Riemann-Christoffel tensor,23
all of which, however, compromised on the original strategy of maintaining
general covariance by employing only covariance-preserving operations.
Other commentators on this episode have focused on the next step, the
interpretation step, in order to explain the failure of this application cycle.
The dynamical inferential conception suggests to closely examine the deduc-
tion step as well. Grossmann, it must be said, did not exploit all deductive
possibilities provided by the ADC. There are other two-index tensors that
can be generated from the Riemann-Christoffel tensor in a way that fully
preserves general covariance. Consulting the mathematical sources, we find
that nothing in the exposition of the ADC in Ricci and Levi-Civita (1901),
or in Christoffel’s (1869) paper, precluded the addition of a trace term like in
the Einstein tensor, or the addition of a scalar term like the later cosmolog-
ical term. Grossmann may even have considered non-linear contractions of
products of the Riemann-Christoffel tensor without violating the covariance-
preserving rules of the ADC. On the other hand, it was not easy to get an
overview of the deductive possibilities from the presentation in Ricci and
Levi-Civita’s (1901) paper, let alone from Christoffel’s paper.24 Crudely put,
23To wit, the construction of the so-called November tensor, which is the part of the
Ricci tensor that transforms covariantly under unimodular coordinate transformations,
and the further postulation of the so-called Hertz- and ϑ-restrictions; see the discussion
in Janssen et al. (2007).
24One of the problems of the ADC paper is that Ricci and Levi-Civita do not state
definitions of all relevant concepts. On p. 162, they give the recipe for the construction
of “all absolute differential invariants of order µ.” This recipe relies on the notions of
“absolute differential invariants” and “algebraic invariants.” While one can guess what
these notions encompass, no explicit definitions are stated in the ADC paper; rather, the
reader is referred to other publications. It is not entirely clear how to construct these
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this is a failure both of the mathematical literature, which did not make
the deductive possibilities sufficiently explicit, and of Grossmann, as he did
not fix the problem by trying to get an exhaustive overview of the algebraic
possibilities.
We have to turn to the interpretation step if we want to understand why
Einstein and Grossmann failed to see that the resources provided by the
Riemann-Christoffel tensor actually did provide a suitable mathematization
of a relativistic theory of gravitation. In evaluating the Ricci tensor as a
possible candidate of an instantiation of the OP slot, we have evidence in
the Zurich Notebook (p. 14L) how the interpretation step failed, see Janssen
et al. (2007, pp. 610). The contraction of the Riemann-Christoffel tensor
yielded four terms with second derivatives of the metric, only one of which
reduced to the Laplacian on going to the weak-field limit. The other three
terms could not be interpreted in terms of the assumed structure of NGT
on going to the limit where the assumed structure should be valid. The
candidate differential operator, the Ricci tensor, did not yield the Newtonian
limit as Einstein expected, and thus violated the main heuristic requirement,
the correspondence principle. Thus, the cycle remained open from Einstein’s
and Grossmann’s point of view.
The failure of this application cycle is a famous episode in the history
of science. The fact that in the Entwurf, Einstein and Grossmann actually
considered the Ricci tensor as a candidate operator for the field equations,
but dismissed this possibility as physically not viable, has puzzled commen-
tators for decades; see, e.g. Pais (1982, sec. 12d). The puzzle got even bigger
when John Norton (1984) pointed out that the Zurich Notebook contained
a discussion also of the reduced tensor that was taken up later in the first of
Einstein’s November papers. Closer inspection of the Zurich Notebook then
revealed that Einstein and Grossmann even had considered the (linearized)
full Einstein equations in their search for a gravitational field equation; see
Renn and Sauer (1999). A detailed line-by-line analysis of the Zurich Note-
book by Janssen et al. (2007) revealed the intricate dynamics of Einstein’s
and Grossmann’s applying tensor calculus in their search for a relativistic
gravitational field equation.
We have evidence from the Zurich Notebook how Einstein and Grossmann
invariants. Thus, the ADC paper is not self-contained at critical points, despite Ricci and
Levi-Civita’s stated goal of making the tools of invariant theory available to practitioners.
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reacted to the failure of the application cycle. They reflected on the steps of
the cycle and concluded that the deduction step that produced a differential
operator for the OP slot from the Riemann-Christoffel tensor needed to be
modified. They introduced additional constraints in order to extract two-
index objects from the Riemann-Christoffel tensor that could be interpreted
in terms of the correspondence principle by taking the Newtonian limit. All
such attempts failed, since Einstein and Grossmann interpreted the addi-
tional constraints realistically as constraints on the gravitational field and
not only on its possible representations.25 When a number of such attempts
had all failed, Einstein and Grossmann gave up on the application cycle
altogether and dismissed the theory of differential invariant as a possible
mathematical structure for their physical problem.
The third cycle. In the third part of the supplement, Grossmann provides the
third specific argument, the explicit steps involved in the derivation of the
“Entwurf operator.” This deduction step does not draw on the novel math-
ematical knowledge provided by the ADC. Rather, Einstein and Grossmann
had given up on the possibility of applying covariance preserving mathemat-
ical methods altogether and the derivation only used tools of algebra and
standard differential calculus.
The strategy now was to go back to the result of the first successful
application cycle, the energy-balance equation (3). But instead of further
exploiting the resources of the theory of differential invariants, Einstein and
Grossmann took the features of the assumed structure as the guiding princi-
ple. They now proceeded by inserting a tentative differential operator Γµν for
Θµν , which they assumed to have the expected form suggested by the New-
tonian limit, and to fix the second-derivatives terms by formal manipulations
that only preserved the validity of Eq. (3).
The derivation of the Entwurf operator along this strategy yielded a
closed application cycle—even though the Entwurf theory eventually proved
untenable—because at the time, the formal algebraic manipulations estab-
lished the Entwurf operator as a uniquely determined object that satisfied
almost all heuristic expectations—Newtonian limit and energy-momentum
conservation—except for the open question as to its precise covariance group.
25We follow the “majority opinion” of Janssen et al. (2007) of distinguishing between
coordinate conditions and coordinate restrictions and interpreting the Hertz- and ϑ-
conditions as restrictions. See Norton (2007) for the minority interpretation.
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Two years later, Einstein discovered that his reasoning did not establish the
Entwurf operator as the unique solution to his heuristics, an insight that
contributed to the demise of the Entwurf theory.
3.3.5. The ADC Cycles: Taking Stock
Looking back at the process of applying mathematics in the ADC episode,
we can discern the following steps and cycles. The specific problem of find-
ing a differential operator acting on the metric (immersion step) which would
take the Poisson equation (assumed structure) to a new, more general field
equation (following the heuristics of the principle of generalized relativity) led
Einstein and Grossmann to explore the ADC, and its predecessors, mainly
as a theory of differential invariants (mathematical domain). Examining the
set of generally covariant differential operators, they were able to produce
a candidate differential operator, the Ricci tensor, of the right form (de-
duction step). However, they were unable to produce the right Newtonian
limit (failure of the interpretation step, conflict with correspondence princi-
ple), and thus failed to find a generally covariant field equation (second cycle
subjectively open). Reflecting on the open cycle, they concluded that a gen-
erally covariant approach to the field equations may be unfeasible (subjective
immersion step mistake), while neglecting some deductive possibilities (ob-
jective deduction step mistake), and, most importantly, wrong expectations
about some intermediate steps in going to the Newtonian limit (objective in-
terpretation step mistake). This concluded the second cycle. What made the
situation more complicated was that, once they had identified the ADC as
a suitable framework, the application to other problems, e.g., to the energy
balance equation, was successful (first cycle closed). This may have suggested
that a tensorial formulation of a theory of gravitation would be worthwhile,
thus creating a tension between the first and the second cycle. Finally, they
were able (driven by the conservation principle) to derive a field equation of
restricted, unknown covariance, the Entwurf equations (third cycle closed),
which, however, did not draw on the ADC (different mathematical domain).
As pointed out before, the Entwurf character can be read off Grosmann’s
part: The paper only provides an outline of a tensorial theory of gravitation,
as the crucial second application cycle remained open for the time being.
3.4. The Aftermath
After settling on the Entwurf field equation, Einstein and Grossmann
penned their joint publication. Einstein held on to the theory for another
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two-and-a-half years, before he gave it up in a dramatic return to general
covariance in the fall of 1915. This part of the drama is a topic in its own
right, and we will not go into details here. On our interpretation, the outcome
of the application cycles leading to the Entwurf theory had temporarily
stabilized the assumed structure, but it had done so by introducing into
the mathematical representation elements that were in conflict with, and
transcended, empirical phenomena such as the Mercury perihelion. Over the
course of the next two-and-a-half years, changes in the assumed structure
were prepared that, in the fall of 1915, led to a renewed attempt of an
application of tensor calculus and the theory of differential invariants on
Einstein’s part. This eventually led to a revision of the theory which, in turn,
enabled a full, successful application of tensor calculus in the formulation of
a relativistic theory of gravitation.
4. Conclusions
The conceptual tools provided by the dynamical inferential conception
allow us to analyze the process of the application of mathematics in a de-
scriptively adequate and philosophically insightful manner.
We have identified application cycles as suitable units that constitute the
(historical) process of applying mathematics. Depending on their success,
they can be open and closed; usually, the construction of a mathematically
formulated empirical theory will be an iteration of many cycles, both open
and closed, objectively or in the eyes of the working scientists. Cycles can be
further analyzed into the components suggested by the inferential conception
as proposed by Bueno and Colyvan. These components follow their own logic,
and, once a cycle is completed, the components make it possible to guide the
further course of action in a process of reflection.
We demonstrated the usefulness of the distinction between assumed struc-
ture, the empirical phenomena which are the starting point of the application
process, and empirical phenomena in general. Not all relevant gravitational
phenomena are part of the assumed structure – the anomalous precession of
Mercury’s perihelion did not play a role in the formulation of GR, but rather
served as a test for the completed theory.
The distinction between immersion step and an interpretation step, as
suggested by Bueno and Colyvan, was also shown to be instructive. We
interpreted the immersion step as the search for a suitable mathematical
theory and the embedding of particular empirical phenomena in that theory.
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The interpretation step brings aspects of the mathematical representation
into contact with empirical phenomena.
Based on the historical study, we argued that the mathematical domain
itself has to be treated as a separate arena of application. We found that some
mathematicians work on abstract mathematical puzzles with negligible ties
to direct application, as witnessed by Christoffel’s work, while others, such
as Ricci and Levi-Civita, strive to make mathematical theories applicable,
facilitating inferences, and even suggesting potential domains of application
– we called this the prior contributions. We also found that Grossmann him-
self put a considerable effort into the application of the ADC to gravitation,
contributing to many aspects of the mathematical theory – we called this the
posterior contributions. The application of mathematics shapes mathemati-
cal theories both from within and through the application process.
We examined the various mathematical sources used in the formulation
of the Entwurf theory, and we found that it is vital to be precise about
the mathematical theory that is actually put to use. In the present case, the
importance of an abstract, invariant-theoretic viewpoint should be stressed as
opposed to the view that differential geometry was the central mathematical
theory for Einstein and Grossmann.
We also sketched the interactions between different application cycles.
The second cycle, prompted by the open OP slot in the field equation frame,
led Einstein and Grossmann to the ADC. This, in turn, made it possible to
reformulate other aspects of the physical knowledge available – the mathe-
matical domain pulls in further applications, as the first cycle shows. How-
ever, this created a tension between the cycles, which could not be resolved
at the time, and was only seemingly fixed in the third cycle, the derivation
of the Entwurf field equations.
The dynamical inferential conception emerged from the application of
the original inferential conception to the case of the collaboration between
Einstein and Grossmann on the Entwurf theory. The interpretation of this
episode in terms of the inferential conception provided a new perspective on
this historical case, with new research questions and new insights, and it led
to a refined version of the inferential conception. The dynamical inferential
conception is useful in the analysis of historical cases for several reasons.
The functional decomposition of the application process into the two do-
mains, and the immersion, deduction, and interpretation steps, forces us to
be precise about the respective contributions of the two domains and their
interaction. The decomposition suggests the distinction between prior and
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posterior contributions of mathematics. Some aspects of application are due
to cycles – think of Grossmann’s contributions, which up to now have not
received the attention that they deserve, while others are due to the internal
dynamics of mathematics – think of the ADC paper, whose internal char-
acteristics also move into the focus of the investigation. The decomposition
of application cycles into separate steps also facilitates the analysis of the
historical application process by providing conceptually distinct stages – ap-
plication is structured, not a blur. We can base our analysis of the historical
actor’s reflection about why a certain application cycle is open or closed on
the decomposition: if an application cycles fails, the mistake has to lie in at
least one of the three application steps. The framework therefore allows us to
ask for the proper categorization of mistakes in failed application cycles. On
the other hand, the fact that some application cycles appeared to be closed,
help to explain why the structure stabilized in preliminary stages as it did
with the Entwurf theory.
There are, of course, many open questions, and there is potential for
further improvement. We have only begun to explore the larger dynamics
that arise if we consider iterated application cycles. More should be said
on the role of reflection on completed cycles, on the different ways in which
cycles can be open, closed, on the ways in which cycles can collide and how
conflicts can be resolved, and on the different problems that can arise within
a cycle, notably the various mistakes in the application steps. We would also
like to elaborate on the application dynamics that is directly related to the
mathematical theories, for example, on the transformation of mathematical
concepts and the corresponding notation – think of Grossmann’s problems
with the ADC’s notation.
In order to further refine the picture we sketched here, it will be useful to
consider further episodes in the genesis of general relativity, particularly if
we want to get a better understanding of the long-term dynamics of cycles.
Also, the present picture should be extended to other cases from the history
of physics. The genesis of quantum mechanics is a prime example in this
respect. Of course, application of the dynamical inferential conception to
examples from other sciences should also be carried out.
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